Abstract-Programs that implement computer communications protocols can exhibit extremely complicated behavior, and neither informal reasoning nor testing is reliable enough to establish their correctness: In this paper we discuss the application of modular program verification techniques to protocols. This approach is more reliable than informal reasoning, but has an advantage over formal reasoning based op finite-state models: the complexity of the proof need not grow unmanageably.as the size of the program increases. Certain tools of concurrent program verification that are especially useful for protocols' are presented: history varigbles that record sequences of input and output'values, temporal logic for expressing properties that must hold in a future system state (such as eventual receipt of a message), and module specification and composition rules. The use. of these techniqqe5 is illustrated by verifying two data transfer protocols frow 'the literature: the alternating bit protocol and a protocol proposed by Stenning. ' ' 
I. INTRODUCTION

P
ROGRAMS that implement computer communication protocols can exhibit extremely complicated behavior, because they mpst cope with asynchronous computing agents and the possibility o'f failures in the agents and in the communication 'medium.. A survey of the literature in the area of protocol, verification can be. found in. Bochmann and Sunshine [ 2 0 ] . Most previous approaches to verifying network protocols have been based upon reachability arguments for finite-' state models of the protocols. This techniqu.e has the advantage ,of being easily automated. 'It encounters difficulties, however, as the state space of the protocol becomes large. For example, finite-state models present difficulties in dealing with propertieq related. to correct data transfer, because representing each value, to be transmitted -can make the 'state space extremely large,, and possibly infinite. Bochmann and Sunshine [20] present some techniques for reducing the state space: partial Verification (not proving all aspects correct), combining or ignoring certain states, using assertions to classify states, and focusing search (not checking all paths). All these techniques involve. ignoring some states or using some ionfinitestate tool (which cannot, in general, be automated).
In contrast, the approach described here models a protocol as a
Paper approved by the Editor for Computer Communication of the IEEE Communications Society for publication without oral presentation. Manuscript received Marchparallel program, and correctness proofs follow the FloydHoare style of program verification. Logical assertions attached to the program abstract information from the representation of the state and allow reasoning about classes of states. This avoids the combinatorial explosion, and the length of the proof need not grow unmanageably as the protocol size increases. (Our technique is not automated, but many automatic Floyd-Hoare verifiers are being developed by others.)
In this approach, the network/protocol system is modeled by a set of interacting modules that represent logical units of the system, such as the communication medium, transmitter, and receiver. There are two kinds of modules to be considered: processes and monitors. A process is an active program component, and a monitor is a data abstraction with synchronization [ 3 ] , [8] . We exploit the modularity of the system model in the construction of proofs. At the lowest level, ' the properties of processes and monitors are verified by examination of their code. In constructing the system proof we use these verified properties and can ignore the internal structure of the module implementations. For example, buffers are an abstract data type that can be implemented in many ways. Any implementation meeting the requirements of the data type may be used in the protocol without affecting the correctness proof of the rest of the system. Two kinds of properties, safety and liueness, are important for parallel systems. Safety properties have the form "bad things will not happen." They are analogous to partial correctness and are expressed by invariant assertions which must be satisfied by the system state at all times. Safety properties are often expressed in terms of auxiliary variables that record the history of the interactions of the modules. Because auxiliary variables are not implemented, they can record histories of unbounded length and are an important element in our proofs. Safety proofs are constructed as follows. One first verifies the invariants of the lowest level modules directly from the code. One then shows that in conjunction these invariants imply the invariants of larger components, ultimately arriving at a proof of the invariant of the whole system.
Liueness properties have the form "good things will happen." They include termination requirements in sequential programs and recurrent .properties in nonterminating progrims like operating systems. Until recently, there has been little work on the verification of liveness properties, other than sequential termination.
Because shows that, in conjunction, they imply the commitments of the higher level modules.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I1 we briefly review some of the tools we will use: temporal logic, history variables, and modular specifications. In Sections 111 and IV we discuss the verification of two protocols, Stennings protocol [ 191 and the alternating bit protocol [ 11 . Our emphasis in these sections is on the specifications of each module, and their composition to imply the system specifications. We will not perform the lowest level verification of invariants and commitments from module code, although we will indicate how it could be performed. That phase of the verification is carried out by Hailpern [7] .
VERIFICATION TOOLS
A . Temporal Logic
Temporal logic provides operators for reasoning about the past and the future, although we will only need the operators for the future.
In the context of program verification, the "future" is a program computation, that is, a sequence of states that could arise during program execution. Informally, the first state in a computation represents the present, and subsequent states represent the future. Computations are not restricted to starting at the beginning of the program, so a "future" state in one computation may be the "present" state in another.
The version of temporal logic we will use was developea by Pnueli [5] , [ 161 -1181, and is further described by Lamport [ lo] . A discussion of its use in program verification can be found in Owicki and Lamport 1151. Its two basic operators are 0 (henceforth) and 0 (eventually). The formula o P (henceforth P) means "P is true for all states in the computation" (P is true now and will remain true forever). The formula OP (eventually P) is interpreted as "there is some state in the computation in which P is true" (P is true now or will become true). The modalities 0 and 0 are duals, that is,
When we say that a temporal formula is true for a program, we mean that it is true for all computations of that program.
Temporal operators can be used to express both safety and liveness properties. For example, program termination, a liveness property, can be expressed by the formula at P 3 0 after P where a t P and after P are assertions that are true of states in which control is (respectively) at the beginning or end of the program. An example of a safety property is an inductive assertion, that is, an assertion that will remain true if it ever becomes true. The following formula states that I is an inthere are an infinite number of future states for which P is true. (To understand this interpretation, note that OP implies that P will be true in some 'future state. The formula 00P
states that this will always be true. In particular, if P ever becomes false, it is guaranteed to become true again at some later time, and this means that it must be true an infinite nqpber of times.) The 00 operator is especially useful for st&ng recurring properties of a program, for example, 00 (the buffer is not full).
We will also use the customary universal and existential quantifiers. Thus, the assertion
states that x will eventually become even. Note that n in this formula is not a program variable;
we will not use formulas in which quantified variable names are also used as program variables in the program under consideration. This should make the meanings of the formulas clear. For another example, consider the assertion
V i ( x = i > o x > i ) .
This assertion states that x only takes on values that are at least as large as its initial value, regardless of what that initial value was.
B. Histories
Our proofs use history variables to record the sequence of messages that are the input and output of the modules of the system. History variables have frequently been used in reasoning about communication systems [6] 
This assertion states that if there is some point at which X has the value A , then at all subsequent times A is an initial subsequence of X . This follows from the fact that the only operation on a history variable is appending a new value.
We now introduce some notation for describing histories. Let A and B be arbitrary history sequences. IfA has elements u , U, y , z' then we can write A = (uwz). If IA I = i~ then we may also write
We denote concatenation of sequences by juxtaposition, that is,
Finally, there are certain temporal assertions about histories which we will use often in reasoning about liveness. The first is an assertion that the size of a given history will grow without bound. It is abbreviated as u ( A ) , where
which is equivalent to
u(A)=Yn(o(lAI=n>OIAI>n)).
The second assertion, given below, states that a particular value occurs an unbounded number of times in the history. 
C. Modular Specifications
A module specification involves three kinds of information. First, safety properties are given by invariants: assertions abobt the modules's variables that are true at all times in the computation. Second, liveness properties are specified by temporal logic assertions called commitments, which describe conditions that the process causes to become true. Finally, the services provided by the module to other modules are described by pre-, post-, and live-assertions about each operation. Pre-and postassertions give safety (partial correctness) properties of the operations. If the precondition holds when the operation is, invoked,, and if it terminates, then at termination the postcondition must, hold. The variables in these assertions must be private to the prbcess that invokes the operation, in the sense that no other process can modify their values. This 'avoids the complexity ,that can arise when dealing with variables ,that are shared between several processes. (A general discussion of private variables is given by Owicki [ 131 .) The live-assertion describes the effects that the operation causes when it is invoked. Live-assertions may involve variables that can be modified by,other processes.
Verifying that a system meets its specifications is done in serveral phases. One phase is to examine the code of low-level modules, and prove that it satisfies the specifications. In the other phase, the specifications of compound modules are verified from the specifications of their components.
Verifying safety properties from code is a well-understood task. To show that an assertion is invariant, one must show that it is true initially, and that it is preseried by each action of the module under consideration (because all of our invariants involve only local and private variables, there is no need to consider interference from other modules). Thus, when we prove that P is invariant, we have proved the temporal assertion Init' 2 0P
where Init' is an assertion that describes the initial state of the program. Proving pre-and postassertions of operations is essentially verifying the partial correctness of the operation's code. Proofs of these safety properties are discussed further in Owicki [ 131 .
Liveness properties of modules (commitments and live assertions) are proved from code using axioms and inference rules about the liveness properties of program statements,expressed in temporal logic. A summary of this approach is given in Section 111-D, and detailed rules are discussed by Hailpern, Owicki, and Lamport [7] , [15] . Note that when we say that P is a commitment, we mean that
Init 3 oP just as with invariants. However, commitments are more complex temporal formulas than invariants. For example, commitments often have the form
To state that this assertion is a commitment means that in any computation starting in a legitimate initial state, whenever P becomes true, Q will be true at the same time or later.
Compound modules are verified by .showing that the invariants and commitments o f the module are implied by the invariants and commitments of its components. At this stage, there is no need to consider the code. This approach lessens the level of detail which must be dealt with at each step. It has the further advantage that the system proof remains valid if any component is replaced by a different implementation that meets the same specifications.
STENNING'S DATA TRANSFER PROTOCOL
To illustrate the application of these program verification techniques to communication protocols we will discuss a simplified version of a data transfer protocol presented by Stenning [19] . (The original version is discussed by Hailpern [7] .) The protocol is required to deliver all input messages in the order in which they are presented. Stenning verified the safety, properties of the algorithm, using a nonmodular proof technique. He did not consider liveness. (It is assumed that message corruption, if it can occur, is detected by a lower level checksum mechanism, and that corrupted messages are discarded.)
The protocol must ensure that the messages are ultimately delivered correctly in spite of this unreliability. This is ac-
complished by attaching a sequence number to the messages sent by the transmitter and the acknowledgments sent by the receiver. The transmitter sends each message repeatedly until it receives an acknowledgment of that message, using a timeout mechanism to trigger the retransmission. The first time the receiver gets a message with a given sequence number, it records the message in the output stream. It also sends the transmitter an acknowledgment for every message it receives.
The names of the history variables used in the proof are indicated in the network diagram in Fig. 2 . As already mentioned, X is the input history of the transmitter (and the entire system), and Y is the output of the receiver (and the system). The input and output histories of the message medium are a and /3, respectively, while the input and output histories of the acknowledgment medium are y and 6. We denote the unbounded sequence of items to be transmitted by 
This is the form of messages in a and /3. An acknowledgment for message i, the pair [i, "ack"] is denoted by Ai: messages in y and 6 have this form. Note that di, Mi, and A i are constants, whose values do not change throughout program execution.
The remainder of this section presents the proof of Stenning's protocol. We first give the specifications of the communication medium (Section 111-A), using temporal logic to make precise assertions about the requirements it must satisfy. We next discuss safety for the simplified protocol, giving the invariants for the transmitter and receiver (Section 111-B), and then using them to prove system invariants (Section 111-C). The proof of liveness properties in Sections 111-D and 111-E follows the same pattern.
A . Communication Medium
The communication medium used by the protocol is not defined by program code; it is essentially a black box about which we have limited information. In fact, what we know about the medium is its specifications. (These specifications could be verified by examining the code of lower level components of the system, just as the specifications of the transmitter and receiver can be verfied from their code.)
Recall that a module specification involves three kinds of information: invariants, commitments, and service specifications. Because the communication medium we are considering is an unreliable one, it has a very weak invariant: nothing comes out that was not put in,
Note that m is a free variable, not a program variable. We observe the usual convention that free variables are universally quantified. Thus, m t r l states that every message in is also a message in a. These safety assertions describe a medium which may lose, duplicate, and reorder messages:
the only assumption is that it does not create spurious ones.
The invariants above would be satisfied by a medium that never. delivered any messages, and in that case no output would ever appear. The medium assumed by Stenning's protocol has two independent commitments that guarantee that some messages ultimately get through. The first is an assertion that if an unbounded number of messages are sent, then messages are infinitely often available to be received.
In these assertions we used the medium function "ExistsM," which returns the value "true" if at least one message is available. A module function in an assertion is interpreted as true of a state if the function would return "true" when invoked in that state.
The second commitment asserts that if the same message is sent over and over again, it will eventually be delivered (provided that the receiving process keeps accepting messages). This commitment is expressed by the formulas
These are about the weakest assumptions we can make and still be able to show that the protocol is able to deliver messages.
Finally, we must specify the operations provided by the medium. In this case there are three: send a message, receive a message, and check to see whether any messages are waiting to be received. The specifications of these services are given below for the medium mtr; the specifications for rnrt are essentially the same. Note that a send operation always terminates, and receive terminates if a message is available. The pre-and postassertions of mtr.ExistsM are both "true," which gives no safety information about the operation.
In fact, we will only use mtr.ExistsM in reasoning about the liveness property that a receive operation terminates.
The timer is another black box, and we could define its properties in a similar way. However, because we will not be doing detailed proofs, it suffices to state that if the timer is set and never canceled, then eventually a timeout notification will be received. Hailpern [7] presents the details omitted here.
B. Safety: Transmitter and Receiver
Safety specifications of processes are given by invariant assertions about the variables of the process. To verify a process invariant, one shows that it holds initially, and is preserved by each operation of the process. This is a straightforward sequential verification problem.
We do not give the details of these verification steps here; we merely state the invariants and explain them informally.
The safety specification of the transmitter consists of two invariants expressed in terms of the abbreviations M j and Ai defined earlier:
The first invariant states that when n items have been input to the transmitter, the output to the medium contains only messages that correspond to those n items with sequence numbers attached. The invariance of T1 can be proved by noting that it holds initially (when all sequences are empty) and that it is preserved by each operation of the transmitter. We could actually prove a much stronger invariant for this version of the protocol, but we do not need it in the system proof. A formal proof that the transmitter maintains these invariants would include reasoning about the transmitter's changes to CY and 6 , using the pre-and postassertions of mtrsend and mrt.receive given in the last section.
The invariant T2 states that the kth input term is not read until after the acknowledgment for the (k -1)st message has been received. This is obvious from the transmitter code.
The receiver has two invariants, which are similar to those of the transmitter: 
C. Safety: System
The system safety specifications are also given by an invariant assertion:
Y I X .
(SI)
This assertion states that the output values are an initial sequence of the input values. It does not imply that any output values are ever produced; that requirement is given in the liveness specifications to be discussed later.
We proceed by assuming the invariants for the transmitter, the receiver, and the communications medium, and showing that the system invariant must follow. As a first step, we note that the hypothesis of the receiver assertion R1
Vm(m E 0 3 3 i(m = Mi)) follows immediately from the safety properties of the transmitter and medium. Because the transmitter only puts legitimate messages into the medium (Tl), and any message that comes out of the medium must have been put in by the transmitter (mtrl), the receiver can only obtain legitimate messages. Now let n = max {i: Mi E p}.
Because the hypothesis of R1 is satisfied, we know that the conclusion of R1 holds, namely
But by mtrl,
M n E / 3 3 M n E a and 7'1 implies that if M , E a, then I X I 2 n and hence For the transmitter, in which mtrsend is embedded in a loop whose body is executed infinitely often, we can conclude o ( l a : I = k > O l a l = k + l ) which implies u (a). Now .let us consider the liveness specifications of the tranmiitter. They consist of three commitments. First, the transmitter output history (Y grows without bound:
u (a).
( W This commitment is independent of any assumptions about the environment. To see that it is satisfied, we note that the transmitter code is a repeating loop which can never be blocked: the only operation that could cause blocking is "receive," and "receive" is only performed when an acknowledgment is known to be available. Given that there is no blocking, the timeout mechanism guarantees that a message is sent out at least once every timer interval.
The second transmitter commitment is oO(mrt. ExistsM) 3 u(6).
This states that the transmitter will increase the size of 6 provided that the environment keeps making acknowledgments available in mrt. This follows from the absence of blocking, and the fact that the transmitter will accept an acknowledgment each time around its loop (if one is available).
The third commitment is a promise to start sending the next data item as soon as the current one has been acknowledged:
Yi(AiE6 3 IXl>Z)3 tlj(Ai E 6 2 (UC(OI, Mi+ 1 ) V I E 6))).
(
3 )
The hypothesis of this commitment is an assertion that the rest of the system must satisfy: an acknowledgment for message i is not received before the transmitter has started to work on message i. Under that assumption, once the transmitter receives acknowledgment j , it starts to send message j + 1, and it will send that message an unbounded number of times unless it eventually receives acknowledgment j + 1.
Next we consider the liveness specifications of the receiver. Again we have three commitments, and they are quite similar to the commitments of the transmitter. First, the receiver will cause and y to grow unboundedly as long as it is able to receive messages from mtr.
o0mtr. ExistsM
~(0). (R4)
The receiver code satisfies these assertions because the repeated availability of messages implies that the receiver cannot be blocked at its receive operation. Therefore, it repeatedly executes its loop body, and each time it increases the length of fl and y. Note that the transmitter commitment T 3 , which corresponds to R3, did not require an assumption about the rest of the system in order to guarantee that the size of (Y keeps growing. This difference between T3 and R3 comes from the fact that the transmitter uses a timeout mechanism and the receiver does not.
The receiver's third commitment is to acknowledge each message it receives: ~i (~j E P > I Y l~i -1 ) A u ( P ) > 3
Y j [ M i E P 3 ( 0 ( I Y I Z j )
A (~4 7 ,
This commitment is analogous to transmitter commitment T5. Assuming that message i does not arrive until the receiver has processed message i -1, and that fl grows unboundedly, the receiver will acknowledge each message it receives until the next one arrives, and will add dk to the output sequence Y . (It is necessary to assume u ( 0 ) because the receiver can block if messages do not arrive; such an assumption is unnecessary for the transmitter, because it can never block.)
E. System Liveness
The system liveness property we ultimately want to prove is that each message is eventually output. Because the safety property tells us that any output produced is an initial segment of the input sequence, all we need to establish is that the output stream gets arbitrarily long, that is,
u(Y). (S2)
Our first step is to prove that all of the medium history variables grow unboundedly. This follows from commitments of the processes and media:
In combination, these assertions imply that all of the history sequences grow without bound, that is,
and that input is infinitely often available for mrt.receive and mtr.receive.
We now proceed to prove S2, using induction on the length of Y . The induction step is to show that if Y contains k messages at some point, then it will eventually contain k + 1 messages:
The first step in the proof is to establish the hypotheses of assertions T5 and R5,which state that messages and acknowledgements do not arrive before the recipient is ready to handle them. This is actually a safety property of the system; it often turns out that liveness proofs require additional safety properties. It can proved easily from the safety specifications of the We now know that the conclusions of T5 and R5 hold, so we can reason with the simpler forms Now let us prove the induction step. Suppose that at some point 1 Y I = k . Then, applying RS', either Now case l a implies OMk+, E P (using mtr3), so case l a reduces to case 2. But case 2 implies 0 1 Y I 2 k + 1 (using The original protocol consists of two processes and a communication medium; both processes can send and receive data from outside users.
R5').
We take a slightly different view of the protocol by restricting the services that the two processes provide and by including a second medium. Only process A will receive data from users, and only process B will send data to users. These changes do not significantly modify the problem, but they make the proof easier to understand. ProcessA reads data from an external unbounded source of data 3E'. The history of the data that the process has read is called X . A sequence bit and a datum arexombined into a message, which is sent to process B by way of communication medium mab. Process B receives the messages from mab, strips off the sequence bit, and outputs the data to the unbounded sink r.
The history of the data that the process has output is denoted Y . Acknowledgments, consisting of a sequence bit and the datum "ack," are sent back to process A by way of medium mba. The histories a, 0, y, and 6 record the messages sent to and from the media. Fig. 5 shows the system diagram. The media are modeled as single-element buffers that can change a sequence number to the constant "error." Such a change represents a corruption of the datum. (This model of corruption is reasonable if we assume the existence of a lower level mechanism that detects corrupted messages by using a checksum. The corrupted messages can be reported in the manner described above.) Our goal is to show that the protocol delivers messages in the correct order, in spite of the possibility of corruption by the medium. The code for processes A and B is presented in Fig. 4 .
A . The Communication Medium
The communication media assumed by the alternating bit protocol are somewhat more reliable than those discussed for Stenning's protocol. Messages can be corrupted (in a detectable way), but they cannot be lost, duplicated, or re- ordered. The first invariant expresses this assumption about data transfer: (mbal) where corrupted (m) is true if the sequence bit of message m is "error." The corresponding invariants for the communication media for Stenning's protocol (mtrl and mrtl) merely asserted that any message that appeared in the output.history must also appear in the input history.
The media for the alternating bit protocol have a fixed buffering capacity of one message. This means that a medium must be either empty or full, and that the input history can be at most one element longer than the output history. These facts are expressed by the next two invariants:
ifmba.emptythenIy)=i61elseIyI=I6l+l. (mba3)
Because the media for the Stenning protocol had an unbounded capacity, there were no invariants analogous to these.
There is one liveness commitment for the alternating bit media. If message m is sent an unbounded number of times, and an unbounded number of receives are performed, then message m is received correctly an unbounded number of times. This is expressed by the commitment
Note that, this is the same as commitments mtr3 and mrt3. 
B. Safety: Process A .
As before, we denote the ith data value to be transmitted by di. The messages in history a contain a data value and a single bit of sequencing information. The message for the ith datum is Mi, where
The first invariant of process A relates the histories X and a:
The superscripts in invariant A 1 are derived from those used in regular expressions. In other words, when tz items have been input to process A , the output to mab is a sequence of repeated messages: one or more copies o f M , , then one or more copies of M,, and so on, ending with zero or more copies of M,. The last term is M,*, rather thanM,', because after the operation f.read, the nth data item has been read into X, but message M , has not yet been sent. The invariance of A 1 is easy to see, because process A repeatedly reads a data item and then transmits the corresponding message until it receives an acknowledgement. Although this invariant is considerably stronger than T1, the transmitter in the simplified form of Stenning's protocol actually satisfies the invariant A I . However,Stenning's protocol was designed to deal with a medium in which messages could be reordered, so the stronger invariant was not necessary.
The second invariant of process A relates the sizes of a and 6: 1 6 1 G 1 a 1~1 6 1 + 1 .
(A 2 )
This follows from the fact that process A repeatedly executes a loop in which it sends a message via mab and then accepts a message from mba.
The third invariant establishes the correspondence between acknowledgments in 6 and messages in y. In Stenning's protocol this correspondence was obvious, because both messages and acknowledgments contained a Cull sequence number. In the alternating bit protocol, they contain only a single bit of sequencing information. However, the full sequence number can be determined by examining the bit fields of the preceding messages in the history: a change in parity between successive elements signals a change in sequence numbers.
We define #(a, i) to be the number of changes in parity in a up to and including element i ; thus, it is the sequence number of the ith element in the sequence. More precisely,
#(a,(?)
Note that a state with #(a, 1) = 0 cannot occur in this system, because AI states that if 1 a I 2 1 , then a1 .bit = 1. We will denote the last sequence number in the history by #(a), where #(a) = #a, la I).
Determining the sequence numbers of acknowledgments in 6 is a bit more complicated, because 6 may contain errors. Elements of 6 have the form [bit, "ack"] , where "bit" is an element of {C!, 1, error}. In order to define # on 6 , we use a projection 6 that contains only the noncorrupted elements of 6 : 6 = project (6, bit # error).
A projection of a history on a Boolean expression creates a new history that contains only those elements for which the Boolean expression is true. The order of the elements of the original sequence is preserved in the projected sequence. The new sequence 6 has only the acknowledgments bit equal to 0 or 1.
We can define #(6, i) in the .same way as #(a, i).
let the projection 71 take to 6 n ( i ) . We can extend 6 as follows:
with Now # to where #(6,0) = 0.
We are now ready to relate the parity changes of a to those of 6. The third invariant for process A states that the ith message is not sent until the (i -1)st acknowledgment has been received and the ith item has been read from x:
The invariance of this assertion follows easily from the code: it is only after a change in parity is detected in S that a new element is read from x and then sent to a.
C. Safety: Process B
The first three invariants for process B are much the same as the invariants for process A . We can define #(y, i) in the same way that we defined #(a, i), because neither a nor y contains any errors. Because both 6 and p can contain errors, we define #(o, i) in the same way as #(6, i). We also define Ai as the pair 
The fourth invariant states that process B's output Y will be legitimate if its input p is legitimate:
The hypothesis of B4 (which will be proved as a system safety property) implies that the uncorrupted messages in are legitimate messages (they contain a datum from X and the appropriate sequence bit) and they are preceded by the appropriate number of parity changes. The ith element is added to Y only after process B receives a message with derived sequence number i, and the value that is appended to Y is the one contained in the message.
D. Safety: System
The system invariant for the alternating bit protocol is the same as for Stenning's protocol:
Its proof requires three further system invariants, which can be derived from the conjunction of the module invariants. The first invariant relates the sequence numbers of elements in a and p. 
1-lXl)
= 1 A each term in the sum is between 0 and 1.
(S4)
This invariant implies that there is at most one point in the system where there is a message to be processed.
Proof of S4:
Algebraic simplification establishes that the sum in S4 is 1. The fact that each term is nonnegative follows from the process invariants and the system invariants just proved.
Because each difference is nonnegative, and their sum is 1 , each term in the sum must be no greater than 1 . We are now ready to prove the system invariant S1, that is, Y 5 X .
Proof of S I :
To prove S1, we need to prove the hypothesis of B4, that is,
).
Let rz = I p I. We know from nzab 1 that -corrupted (0, ) 3 p, = a, and from A1 that a, =M#(,,n) .
So the hypothesis of B4 will be proved once we have shown -corrupted Con) 3 (#(a, n) = #@, n)), that is, that or and 0 assign corresponding sequence mmbers for the last element in unless it is corrupted. Now assume -corrupted (p,). We know from S4 that #(a) -#(p) < 1 . We can rewrite this difference, using the fact that #(p, n) = #(p) to obtain the equivalent relation
The first term in the sum is nonnegative, given the definition of # and the fact that ma63 implies laI2=1/3I=n. Thus, the second term must be no greater-than 1 ; it is also nonnegative and even (S2). Because the only nonnegative even integer less than 2 is 0, we have the required result that This establishes the hypothesis of B4, so we can conclude
Y 5 ( d i ) E ( f ) . The relation
Y 5 X then follows from A l .
E. Liveness: Processes A and B #(a, n ) = #(P, n).
Now let us consider the liveness specifications of process A .
They consist of four commitments. First, the process will initially put something into the buffer nzab, because there is no way it can become blocked before one value is put in. To see that this is the case, note that process A repeatedly executes its loop unless it is blocked because nzba is empty or because mab is full. Given the hypothesis that mba is full, the next execution of the loop body cannot become blocked at mba.receive. Thus it either adds an element to mab or becomes blocked because mab.is full, In either case, we have Omab.ful1.
The fourth commitment is a promise to start sending the next data item as soon as the current one has been acknowledged:
u ( a ) > Y j ( # ( 6 )~i > (~~( c u , M j + l ) V O ( # ( 6 )~i +
1)). ( A 7 )
The hypothesis of A7 implies that the process does not become pemanently blocked. Under that assumption, if process A receives acknowledgment j , then A starts to send message j + 1; it will send that message an unbounded number of times unless it eventually receives acknowledgment i + 1.
Next consider the liveness specifications of process B. There are three commitments, and they are essentially the same as A5-A7. (There i s no commitment analogous to A4, because process B can be blocked before it produces any output.) o0mba. empty
F System Liveness
System invariant S I states that if any output appears in Y , it is the same as the input in X . The liveness property that we want to prove is that the length of the output history increases without bound:
Our proof will be structured much like the proof of system liveness for Stenning's protocol. The first step will be to show that the buffer histories grow without bound, that is, that values are repeatedly transmitted between the processes. This will establish the hypotheses of the process commitments A7 and B7, and system liveness follows,in much the same way as before. However, the reason that the buffer histories grow without bound is somewhat different in the two protocols. In Stenning's protocol, the transmitter included a timeout mechanism that repeatedly retransmitted messages that had not been acknowledged. Thus, the transmitter caused a to grow unboundedly, and then the commitments of the communication medium and the receiver guaranteed that 0 would grow unboundedly. The alternating bit protocol does not rely on timeouts. Instead, the transmitter sends a message each time it receives an acknowledgment from the receiver. If the receiver stopped sending acknowledgments, the transmitter would become blocked and stop sending messages, and vice versa. Because the buffers have a bounded capacity, each process could also become blocked if the other stopped removing items from its input buffer. Our proof must establish that the processes cooperate in such a way that neither becomes blocked.
To demonstrate this cooperation, we need the following system invariant, which implies that at most one of the communication buffers can be full at any time:
-(mab. full A mba. full).
(S6)
Proof of 5'6: Consider the equation ~l~l -l P l~+~l~l -l~l~+~l~l -l~l ) + ( ( 6 ( + l--(cu()= 1. This is obviously an invariant, because the left-hand side of the equation simplifies to 1. Moreover, each term in the sum is always between 0 and 1; the proof is similar to that of S4, using invariants A 2 , mab3, 8 2 , and 1?1ba3. This means that at any time, exactly one term in the sum is equal to 1 and the rest are equal to 0. Now mab3 and mba3 imply m a b . f u l l -( l a l -l P I = 1) mba. full (I y I -16 I = 1).
Because at most one of these differences can be positive at a time, at most one buffer can be full at a time. We are now ready to prove the "no starvation" commitment u(a> A N -9 .
(X71 Proof of S7: We will prove ~(0); u(a) will follow from mab3. We can use B5 to establish ~(0): it is onlynecessary to show o0mba. empty A o0mab. full, or, equivalently, 00-mba. full A oOmab. full.
To show oOmab.ful1, we will show that there is some time at which mab.ful1 is true, and that if it is true at any time i there is a later time k at which it is true again. The fact that mab.ful1 is true at some time comes from the commitment A4. Now suppose i is some time at which rnab.ful1 is true.
By B6, there is a time j 2 i such that mba.ful1 is true at time j. But rnab.ful1 and mba.ful1 cannot be true at the same time (S6), so j > i. Now by A 6 , there is a time k > j such that mab.ful1 is true at time k. Thus, for any time i at which mab.ful1 is true, there is a later time k at which it is true again. This implies oOrnab.ful1. Because only one buffer at a time can be full, this implies 00 -mba.ful1, and that completes the proof of S7.
Note that this proof has been carried out quite informally, to avoid introducing a number of temporal logic theorems that are not important in this context. A more formal proof can be constiucted using the axioms and theorems presented by Hailpern [7, Appendix A] .
Having proved that the hypotheses of A7 and B7 hold, we know that the conclusions also hold: 
(B7')
We are now ready to prove the system liveness property
Proof ofS5: The proof of S5 is similar to the proof of the corresponding property in Stenning's protocol (S2).
V. CONCLUSION
s5.
In addition to the protocols presented here, we have proved the correctness of Brinch Hansen's multiprocessor network [4] . We have found that program verification techniques can be used to prove the safety and liveness of network protocols that handle an unreliable medium. By insisting on modular decomposition and restricting the view of implementation details, we are able to manage the complexity of program proofs. Temporal logic is an important tool, which allows us to state liveness properties in a clear, consistent manner.
